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INTRODUCTION
The Deposit Insurance System (DIS) has long been considered a highly
important financial safety net 1 to prevent bank runs 2 and to restore depositor
confidence, which is why major economies in the world expanded their DIS
coverage during the financial crisis of 2007-08. While most jurisdictions have set
up DIS as an important financial infrastructure, China, the world’s second largest
economy, surprisingly did not adopt any explicit DIS until recently. After
continuous debates for over two decades, the passage of the Deposit Insurance
Regulations (the Regulations) by the State Council of China3 in February 2015
was a long-awaited move toward better disciplining China’s banking sector and
enhancing financial stability. 4 The Regulations came into effect on May 1, 2015.
An insurance promise for the protection of deposits can take place explicitly or
implicitly. An explicit DIS clarifies the obligations of regulatory authorities to
depositors, limits the scope for discretionary decisions, helps to contain the costs
of failed bank resolution, and ultimately provides for a comparably transparent
framework to deal with bank failures. 5 Before the announcement of the DIS,
1

There is no generally accepted definition of key elements of financial safety net. A
narrow definition is limited to deposit insurance, lender of last resort function, and
prudential regulatory and supervisory framework, while a more widely accepted one also
includes failure resolution mechanisms for financial institutions. See FINANCIAL
STABILITY FORUM, GUIDANCE FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
SYSTEMS,
7
(2001),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0109b.pdf. For a more
detailed description, see also Sebastian Schich, Financial Crisis: Deposit Insurance and
Related Financial Safety Net Aspects, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Financial Market Trends, 2 (2008).
2
A bank run is a situation that occurs when a large number of bank or other financial
institution’s customers withdraw their deposits simultaneously due to concerns about
bank’s solvency.
3
The State Council is the chief administrative authority of the People’s Republic of
China. It is chaired by the Premier and includes the heads of each governmental
department and agency. It directly oversees the various subordinate provincial
governments and decides fundamental issues of the country.
4
The Regulations are the official website of Legislative Affairs Office of the State
Council, at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-03/31/content_9562.htm (last
visited Aug. 13, 2015). The original Regulations are presented in Chinese and there is not
a formal English version. Therefore, the understanding of the articles in the Regulations
is based on the author’s personal comprehension.
5
For a comprehensive analysis of the comparisons between explicit DIS and implicit
DIS, see Beat Bernet & Susanna Walter, Design, Structure and Implementation of a
Modern Deposit Insurance Scheme, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum,
at
19-20
(2009),
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China had been using an implicit DIS as the main mechanism to deal with losses
posed by failed depository institutions. Whenever a bank run occurred, China’s
central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), would intervene and
implement its “lender of last resort” mandate to pay out consumer funds and
individual debts of distressed institutions. While this has been reasonably
necessary to maintain financial stability and restore market confidence, the
government bailouts have also subjected taxpayer funds to unacceptable risks and
have increased moral hazard6 in a very significant way. Furthermore, as a result
of the “implicit” feature of the DIS, depositors could not anticipate whether,
when, and how they would be reimbursed. When rumors concerning the failure
of banks spread out, depositors would withdraw their savings within a very
narrow timeframe, thereby accelerating the insolvency of relevant banks.
In the early 1990s, Chinese policymakers and regulatory agencies realized
the defects of the implicit DIS and began moving their efforts towards
establishing an explicit one. With ongoing research and continuous legislative
attempts, the PBOC, in combination with the China Banking Regulatory
Committee (CBRC)7 and other regulatory bodies, designed a draft DIS in 2007.
However, due to the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the legislative process
was delayed. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, many jurisdictions
recognized the insufficiencies of the existing DIS and reinforced its importance
in maintaining financial stability. Reforms on DIS had been conducted by all
major economies through various means, including expanding coverage limits,
adjusting premium rates, and strengthening deposit insurers’ mandates in failure
resolution. China has drawn lessons from these reforms and revised the draft
http://www.suerf.org/docx/s_6547884cea64550284728eb26b0947ef_2437_suerf.pdf.
6
Moral hazard is a situation in which one party gets involved in a risky event knowing
that it is protected against the risks and the other party will incur the cost. In the context
of a financial rescue, it is often referred to as financial institutions will engage in riskier
activities knowing the government will bailout their losses and failures. For a
comprehensive analysis of moral hazard, see RICHARD A. POSNER, VALUES AND
CONSEQUENCES: AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 121 (5th ed. 1998).
7
The CBRC was established in 2003 when the PBOC transferred its banking regulation
mandates into it. As authorized by the State Council, the CBRC is responsible for the
regulation and supervision of depository institutions, while the Financial Stability Bureau
of the PBOC still decides the liquidity support in the event of bank runs. See Country
Report: China, Multi-Year Expert Meeting on Services, Development and Trade: The
Regulatory
and
Institutional
Dimension
(Mar.
17-19,
2009),
http://unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c1mem3p32_en.pdf; see also Xiaoqing Fu &
Shelagh Heffernan, The Effects of Reform on China’s Bank Structure and Performance, J.
BANK FINANCE (2008).
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DIS.
In the wake of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of
the Communist Party,8 held in November 2013, China adopted a Decision on
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform (the Decision),
which determined the direction of China’s development for the following years
under President Xi Jinping’s administration.

9

The Decision sets the

modernization of the financial market as an overarching goal of China’s financial
reform, and highlights that the creation of an explicit DIS is an urgent mission
and a prerequisite for propelling future reforms. These future reforms include
liberalizing interest rates and designing market exit mechanisms for financial
institutions. After one year’s preparatory work, the DIS was finally unveiled to
the public, marking a fundamental turning point of China’s financial industry.
Nevertheless, questions and doubts have risen from the opening of this Pandora’s
box. It seems that China has just reached the starting point of an endless battle.
This essay explains the legislative process of the Chinese deposit insurance,
describes its fundamentals and loopholes, and measures its implications on
China’s financial market. After the introduction, Part I will provide a brief
overview of how China has been dealing with failures of depository institutions
through the problematic implicit DIS. Part II highlights the need for an explicit
DIS in China, which is made urgent by the agenda proposed to push forward
future financial reforms. Part III furnishes the fundamentals of the Regulations
and identifies some unresolved issues about which policymakers have remained
silent despite their skepticism to the effective functioning of the new regime,
drawing lessons from the United States, Europe, and Japan. Part IV further
8

Much as the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China which was a pivotal meeting held in 1978 that marked the
beginning of the “Reform and Opening-up” policy, this session held in November 2013
has viewed by many as another starting point for China’s development. For more
information
about
the
session,
see
http://english.cntv.cn/special/18thcpcsession/homepage/index.shtml (last visited Aug. 6,
2015).
9
The Third Plenary Session came as China was facing major economic and social
challenges. The Third Plenary Session and the Decision are together considered as a
“turning point” that determines the direction of reform of the new leadership in China led
by President Xi Jinping in the following years. For the contents of the Decision, see
Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major
Issues
Concerning
Comprehensively
Deepening
the
Reform,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/131112-third-plenum-decision---official-english-tr
anslation.pdf.
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provides an overview of the impacts that the DIS will pose on China’s banking
industry, banking regulatory structure, and depositors. A brief conclusion then
follows.
I.

IMPLICIT DEPOSIT INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF
PROBLEMATIC BAILOUTS
China’s banking industry is burdened by governmental and political

influences, often in ways that are not fully transparent or unambiguous. While it
is perhaps idiosyncratic to analyze banking resolution in China through
governmental and political lenses, it is also largely uncontested to date that the
government’s involvement in banking through ownership control, business
decision-making interference, and all other forms of dictatorial interventions are
likely responsible for wrongful bank operations and costly regulatory forbearance
in the past decades.10
China has been operating an implicit DIS since the establishment of its
contemporary financial system in 1979.11 Unlike developed financial markets,
China’s financial industry was very immature at that time. Not only were there a
very limited number of banks and other types of financial institutions, but also
the services and functions of those institutions were quite simple. Banks were
often government-backed and could not operate independently. The major
breakthrough of China’s banking industry took place in the mid-1980s with the
commercialized functioning of the Big-Four banks (the Bank of China (BOC),
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
(ICBC), and China Construction Bank (CCB)), and with the establishment of a
10

Governmental intervention in the form of ownership and political control should have
been responsible for heavy loan losses of Chinese banking industry during the planned
economy period. See Patrick Honohan, Protecting Depositors in China: Experience and
Evolving Policy in DEPOSIT INSURANCE AROUND THE WORLD: ISSUES OF DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION, 339-41 (The MIT Press 2008).
11
From 1950s to the late 1970s, the PBOC served as not only the central bank but also
the sole commercial bank in China. In 1979 after the “Reform and Opening-up” policy
was proposed, the requirement of developing a competent banking system to satisfy the
demand of the economic reforms was emphasized by Chinese central government and
immediate steps were taken. The Agricultural Bank of China was re-established in
February 1979; the Bank of China was separated from the PBOC and was directly
accountable to the State Council (before this, the BOC was the International Department
of the PBOC, handling foreign business in the name of itself); the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China was set up in 1984 to take over the commercial activities of
the PBOC. See Yangxin Huang, The Banking Market System, in FINANCIAL REGULATION
IN THE GREATER CHINA AREA: MAINLAND CHINA, TAIWAN AND HONG KONG, 27, (Kluwer
Law International 2000).
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large number of joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, and urban
and rural cooperatives. However, as the financial market became increasingly
diversified and complicated, and as financial risks continued to accumulate, the
insufficiency of regulators’ capability to deal with bank failures became a
conspicuous concern. Due to the regulatory inertia utilizing public injections to
rescue banks, as well as the lack of regulatory techniques to prevent banks from
losing their going-concern values, large-scale government bailouts were
undertaken in the late-1980s. These problematic bailouts contributed to the
increasing lack of market discipline.
A. The Closure of Hainan Development Bank
The Hainan Development Bank (HDB) closure case was the first bank
closure case in China’s financial history. As one of China’s earliest regional
commercial banks, HDB was established in 1995 by the government of Hainan
Province to support the development of Hainan’s special economic zone, under
the basis of asset reorganization of five badly operated trust and investment
companies.12 The initial asset evaluation of HDB was simply based on the data
of the balance sheets provided by the five companies without independent
audit.13 From the very beginning, HDB was built on a shaky foundation. The
registered capital of HDB reached 1.67 billion RMB, but the actual raised capital
was only 1.07 billion RMB.14 To make matters worse, more than 50% of the
initial capital went back to several founding shareholders in the form of loans.
Eventually, HDB’s total debts exceeded 5 billion RMB,15 at a time when the
market was devastated by the craze of overinvestment and the real estate bubble
in Hainan was bursting.
At the end of 1997, Hainan’s local government merged 28 troubled urban
credit unions with HDB. These credit unions had similarly high levels of bad real
estate debts, but even more toxic was the fact that that they provided annual
12

These five companies were Funan International Trust & Investment Company,
Shuxing Trust & Investment Company, Zheqiong Trust & Investment Company of
Haikou City, Huaxia Financial Company of Haikou City and Jiya Trust & Investment
Company of Sanya City.
13
Calla Wiemer & Heping Cao, Asian Economic Cooperation in the New Millennium:
China’s Economic Presence, 282 (World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 2004).
14
Wenyong Wu, Study on State Aid Legal Systems of Market Exit Mechanisms of
Financial Institutions 101, CHINA UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW PRESS
(2012) [in Chinese]. The exchange rate of Renminbi to dollar is approximately 0.12 from
1995 to 2000.
15
Id. at 102.
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interest rates as high as 20％ to attract depositors. When HDB, as their successor,
failed to pay high interest rates, serious liquidity risk problems hounded the
doomed bank. In February 1998, rumor spread that HDB would soon be bankrupt.
Depositors quickly withdrew their deposits from HDB. Despite the fact that local
government officials hastened to deny the distress of HDB, a sizeable bank run
was already unavoidable.16
In fact, the PBOC had been furnishing HDB with financial assistance since
its establishment. In December 1996, HDB was approved to issue a special
financial bond equal to 0.5 billion RMB to cover a liquidity shortfall. 17 In 1997,
the PBOC provided emergency aid amounting to 3.15 billion RMB to support
HDB, which was even allowed to utilize the entire value of its reserves. 18 In
1998, the PBOC again approved HDB to issue a bond of 0.9 billion RMB in
February and another bond of 0.5 billion RMB in April, both of which failed to
ease the liquidity risk. 19 Meanwhile, HDB was licensed to establish new
branches outside Hainan Province to absorb capital. However, all of the above
attempts only prolonged HDB’s last gasp before it finally met its doom. In June
1998, the PBOC administratively closed HDB, and ICBC assumed all of HDB’s
assets and liabilities.
The failure of HDB was a typical case illustrating how the central bank and
local government acted as full guarantors to compensate for the losses of a bank
when an explicit DIS was absent. From its establishment to its closure, HDB
operated as a shadow of the local government, aiming to reorganize numbers of
distressed firms with poor assets. Sound corporate governance structures and
internal control mechanisms had never been set up. Following the administrative
closure of HDB, substantial amounts of public funding had been injected to pay
out depositors and other individual creditors. However, due to the lack of
applicable bankruptcy laws and viable liquidation procedures, HDB remains an
open case to this today. 20

16

Id. at 102; see also Michael Faure & Jiye Hu, Towards a Deposit Guarantee Insurance
in China? A Law and Economics Perspective, 1(2) CHIN. J. COMP. LAW. 256, 260-261
(2013).
17
Hua Liu, Enlightenment of the Hainan Development Bank’s Close Down, 2 THE
BANKER 23 (2004) [in Chinese].
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Ever since the closure of the HDB, authorities never stop their efforts in bringing it
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B. The Rescue of the “Big-Four” Banks
While the Big-Four banks have made great contributions to maintaining
financial stability in China, they also have aggregated huge risks. 21 At the end of
the 1990s, non-performing loans (NPLs) of the Big-Four banks exceeded 3.2
trillion RMB, representing a serious threat to China’s financial market and the
economy. 22
The potential risks inherent in the long-existing NPLs compelled the
government to step up its efforts to tackle the problem. In 1998, the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) injected 270 billion RMB into the Big-Four banks through
issuing special treasury bonds.23 As a direct result of this infusion, the capital
adequacy ratio of each of the Big-Four banks immediately reached 8% by the end
of 1998, surpassing the threshold requirement under the Basel accord.24 However,
the liquidity support failed to bring about anticipated improvement of the
Big-Four banks, as they did not make significant changes with their management
systems and lending patterns. Large amounts of NPL’s were again accumulated
within the Big-Four banks. In 1999, drawing on the United States’ experience in
establishing the Resolution Trust Corporation to resolve financial firms’ bad
assets, China established four asset management companies (AMCs) to manage
and dispose of the NPLs in the Big-Four banks.25 Hence, China Cinda Asset
back to life through, for example, proposing reorganization plan. However, due to the
lack of bank insolvency laws, huge amounts of debts and non-performing loans of the
HDB have still not been effectively addressed and thus the HDB has still not been
declared bankrupt.
21
Each of the Big-Four banks traditionally have been designated to provide specific
financial assistance for a particular sector of state economy or for specific state-owned
enterprises, which tended to make them suffer severe losses and non-performing loans
gained quickly. See Daniel L. McCullough, Feeling the Stones: Measuring the Potential
of Deposit Insurance in China through a Comparative Analysis, 11 N.C. BANKING INST.
421, 423-25 (2007) (discusses the poor lending practices of the Big-Four Banks).
22
Liming Li & Renxiong Zeng, Big Changes of China Finance from 1979-2006 18
(Shanghai People’s Press 2007) [in Chinese].
23
Jing Leng, China’s Banking Reform in the Context of Globalization and Transition,
17(5) EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1271, 1281 (2006).
24
Id.
25
The RTC was a U.S. asset management company charged with liquidating assets that
had primarily been assets of savings and loans associations declared insolvent during the
Savings & Loans crisis of 1980s. In 1995, its duties were transferred to the Savings
Association Insurance Fund (“SAIF”) of FDIC. In 2006, the SAIF and the Bank
Insurance Fund, which was also sponsored by the FDIC, were together combined to form
the Deposit Insurance Fund under the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005. See
Lee Davison, Politics and Policy: The Creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation, 17,
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Management Corporation, China Huarong Asset Management Corporation,
China Orient Management Corporation, and China Great Wall Management
Corporation were established for the purpose of taking over the NPLs of each of
the Big-Four banks, respectively. The four AMCs initiated three rounds of NPL
take-overs in 1999, 2004 and 2005, with the total amounts of stripped NPLs
exceeding 2.8 trillion RMB. 26 Officially, according to the CBRC, the NPL
resolution through the establishment of the AMCs worked efficiently, as statistics
showed that the Big-Four banks’ bad loans stood at a reduced total of 1.57 trillion
RMB and the banks’ average NPL ratio dropped to 15.6% at the end of 2004.27
But it was also undeniable that rather than resolving existing problems, the
establishment of AMCs stimulated new bad assets and critics. For example, the
AMCs had been criticized for low recovery rates and had even been accused of
selling state assets at bargain prices. 28 Public bailouts were still the unavoidable
mechanism of choice to save the Big-Four banks, despite the government’s
repeated warnings that every bailout plan was their last “free supper.”
Serious problems had emerged in the resolution process of the Big-Four
banks’ NPLs that exposed significant loopholes in the institutional design of
China’s financial system. The Big-Four banks could undoubtedly be categorized
as institutions “too big to fail.” Hence, the expectation of governmental
assistance profoundly reinforced their motivation to conduct even riskier
behaviors. The moral hazard resulting from that implicit guarantee exposed
taxpayers to unacceptable risks and distorted the level playing field between the
Big-Four banks and comparably smaller institutions.
C. The Resolution of Rural/Urban Credit Cooperatives
The rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) were established before the founding
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. When the RCCs were
reintroduced in 1951, they developed quickly and greatly promoted the
restoration of the rural economy. The urban credit cooperatives (UCCs) were
created after the RCCs, and after the establishment of the first UCC in Luohe

FDIC BANKING REV., No.2 (2005).
26
Wu, supra note 14, at 79-80. See also Guonan Ma, Sharing China’s Bank
Restructuring Bill, CHINA & WORLD ECONOMY Vol. 14, No. 3, 2006,
https://www.bis.org/repofficepubl/apresearch0605ma.pdf.
27
Leng, supra note 23, at 1281-1283.
28
Id.
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County of Henan Province in 1979,29 UCCs gradually developed as one of the
most vibrant layers of China’s financial system to animate the market economy.
Nevertheless, both RCCs and UCCs had eventually become problematic enough
to attract the attention of the regulatory authorities. Some RCCs and UCCs
became subsidiaries of their investors, most of which were local governments or
state-owned banks and enterprises. The motivation of these investors to engage in
activities with RCCs and UCCs was not to assist them to become profitable firms,
but to regard them as a tool for realizing their secret ulterior goals, such as
arranging job opportunities for their relatives and making easy money. Some
RCCs and UCCs operated businesses beyond their licensed scope and even made
use of policy loopholes to obtain illegal earnings. Like other small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) facing difficulty in expanding business and
gaining profits through normal market strategies, many RCCs and UCCs
provided tempting high interest rates to attract depositors. At the end of the 1990s,
the official NPL rate for cooperatives was estimated to be 50% of total loans. 30
Low quality of assets and insufficiency of risk management had made the
resolution of RCCs and UCCs an urgent priority.
To solve the debt burdens and business strategy problems of credit
cooperatives, the PBOC stopped licensing new UCCs. In the institutional reform
of 1995, all UCCs were ordered to restructure by one of the following methods: 1)
to be acquired by city commercial banks; 2) to be acquired by joint-stock
commercial banks; or 3) to merge with RCCs.31 At the end of 1999, more than
2,300 UCCs were merged with city commercial banks. 32 In 2003, the State
Council launched the Pilot Plan to Deepen the Reform of Rural Credit
Cooperatives to clarify the ownership of RCCs and to put them under the direct
supervision of local governments. 33 Moreover, the PBOC provided strong
29

Eric Girardin & Xie Ping, Urban Credit Cooperatives in China, OECD Development
Centre
Working
Paper
No.125,
at
41,
http://www.oecd.org/development/pgd/1919655.pdf.
30
Wu, supra note 14, at 81.
31
Xuejin Zuo, The Development of Credit Unions in China (2001), at 3-4,
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/Conferences/financial_sector/PastFailuresoftheCredi
tUnion.pdf (last visited July 28, 2015).
32
Che-Cheong Poon, Rebuilding a Robust Financial Cooperatives System in China:
Learning from the Experience of Credit Union movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan, 3
INT’L J. COOP.STUD., 16 (2014).
33
The
original
rule
is
available
at
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2003/content_62255.htm (last visited July 28, 2015)
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political, financial and fiscal support to RCCs. For example, the PBOC issued
targeted loans and commercial papers to RCCs eligible to the pilot plan to help
them to remove their historic burdens. The MOF offered government subsidies to
RCCs who paid extra interest to inflation-proof savings accounts due to the
implementation of the pilot plan.34 From 2003 to 2005, corporate income taxes
were completely exempted for all pilot RCCs in western areas of China, and half
exempted for pilot RCCs in other areas. While these efforts to reorganize RCCs
and rural financial systems had, to some extent, moderated the deficits of RCCs,
the costs were considerable. As part of the 2003-2005 reform package, the PBOC
provided 168 billion RMB conditional debt-for-bills swaps and 830 million RMB
earmarked central bank loans to assist RCCs to clear up debt burdens and toxic
loans.35
It appears that among the most plausible reasons why Chinese authorities
stepped in to resolve RCCs and UCCs’ issues was the desire to preserve the
“diversity value” of the banking system and to promote financial inclusion, so
that SMEs, as well as vulnerable individuals like low-income farmers and
workers, could receive equal access to financial services and sufficient protection
of their savings. In order to propel the development of micro-financial services in
rural areas, China established the “Rural Mutual Cooperative” (RMC) in 2007, a
new type of cooperative that was intended to operate as a fund-raising
organization in rural communities.36 Judging from their market performance,
RMCs still, to a large extent, rely on governmental funding. Hence, a question is
quite outstanding here: do bailouts in the name of promoting financial inclusion
actually achieve their goals, or do they worsen regulatory incentives?
The cases discussed above make manifest that both large state-owned banks,
like the Big-Four banks, and small institutions, like local commercial banks,
RCCs and UCCs, benefited from the controversial guarantee provided by the
government. This was fairly reasonable, as China had been operating an
extremely unified financial system. Before the financial reform of 1979, although
[in Chinese].
34
Wu, supra note 14, at 82.
35
Lynette Ong, Prosper or Perish: Credit and Fiscal Systems in Rural China, 43 (Cornell
University Press 2012).
36
CBRC Interim Provisions on the Administration of Rural Mutual Cooperatives, Jan.
2007, http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=5852&CGid (last visited
June 27, 2015).
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new banks like CCB and ABC had been established, they were largely
subordinated to the PBOC, and even the PBOC had been incorporated into the
MOF in 1969.37 Under this unified scheme, banks were affiliates of a very strong
central government that directed the banks fund-raising, internal management,
profits and losses, as well as all other aspects of ongoing operations. Following
the “Reform and Open” policy set forth in 1978, China began to reorganize its
financial system and gradually headed towards marketization reform, but the
defects of the old financial system were difficult to correct overnight. As
estimated by a senior official of the PBOC in 2006, the gross domestic product
(GDP) of China in 2005 was about 15 trillion RMB, by which time the
government had spent 5 trillion RMB in saving failed financial institutions. This
means that one-third of the nation’s GDP had been offset by financial bailouts. 38
While implicit DIS had played an important role in maintaining China’s
financial and social stability in the transitional period from planned economy to
market economy, its disadvantages are outstanding. The government has
absorbed enormous amounts of costs in paying for the losses of financial
institutions, which will inevitably be passed on to taxpayers. The prospects of
overall government bailouts strengthen the incentives of financial institutions to
pursue riskier activities to obtain higher profits. As we retrospectively review the
evolution of the HDB and other SMEs, we notice that the reasons for their
failures were strikingly similar, and one of the most dominant being the use of
high interest rates to attract depositors and the simultaneous neglect regarding
risks of timely reimbursement. Regulators frequently resort to bailouts instead of
letting financial institutions collapse into bankruptcy out of fear that the losses
generated by a failure would cascade through the financial system, freeze the
financial market, and ultimately stop the economy. However, it is necessary for
regulators to achieve a delicate balance in the role they play in financial
supervision. On one hand, it is their crucial task as the lender of last resort to
promote confidence and stability through funding guarantees; on the other hand,

37

Wu, supra note 14, at 84.
Jiao Jinpu (焦瑾璞), Jianli Guifan de Shichang Tuichu he Jianguan Xietiao Jizhi (建
立 规 范的 市场 退出 和监 管协 调机 制 ) [Establishing Market Exit and Regulatory
Coordination
Mechanism],
SOHU
FIN.
(Apr.
23,
2006,
3:35PM),
http://business.sohu.com/20060423/n242951481.shtml.
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it is equally important that they uphold regulatory discipline through prudent
supervision and strengthen market discipline by making clear the limits of the
extent of government aid.
II. EXPLICIT DEPOSIT INSURANCE: A PREREQUISITE
PROPELLING FURTHER REFORMS

FOR

Along with the implementation of the implicit DIS, China has consistently
made attempts to establish an explicit DIS. The earliest attempt can be traced
back to 1993, when the State Council put forward The Decision on the Reform of
the Financial System (the Decision) and made the first formal announcement that
China should adopt a DIS.

39

In 1997, a task force on deposit insurance was

created to research the viability of an explicit DIS in China. After several years of
work, in 2003, the task force issued a report outlining some key issues
concerning the establishment of a DIS, including the steps and timeframe to
transition from an implicit DIS to an explicit one, the methodology to deal with
moral hazards, the institutional design of the DIS, and so on.40 By the end of
2007, a draft DIS rule had been passed on to relevant ministerial departments for
legislative review, but the onset of the global financial crisis delayed the process.
In the post-crisis era, China had re-promoted the agenda for the establishment of
a DIS. In November 2013, as stated in its Introduction, the Decision reiterated the
determination of the Chinese government to establish an explicit DIS as a sound
mechanism to prevent systemic risks, and set a deadline for its establishment.
The Report on the Work of the Government of 2014 articulated that China intends
to “deepen reform of the financial sector and establish a DIS and improve [the]
risk disposal mechanism of financial institutions.”41 In November 2014, the
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Guowuyuan Guayu Jinrong Tizhi Gaige de Jueding (国务院关于金融体制改革的决
定) [Decision of the State Council on Reform of the Financial System] (promulgated by
the St. Council., Dec. 25, 1993, effective Dec. 25, 1993), ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/dotscorotfs549/. The principal debate over the
necessity of introducing deposit insurance in China at that time was whether banking
industry should be competitive. Many held that banking industry is a core national
economic sector thus needed full governmental backup. But gradually Chinese authorities
realized that monopoly in banking industry would devastate market environment and
jeopardize financial consumer interests, and therefore, competition should be enhanced.
See Bing Xu et al., Measuring Banking Competition in China: A Comparison of New
versus Conventional Approaches Applied to Loan Markets, Bank for Int’l Settlements
Working Papers No. 422, 6-10 (2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/work422.pdf.
40
Task Force Team of People’s Bank of China, Some Thinking on Building up a Deposit
Insurance System in China (2003) 5 CHINA FIN, at 17 [in Chinese].
41
Keqiang Li, Report on the Work of the Government, Xinhuanet (Mar. 16, 2014
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revised draft DIS was proposed to call for public consultation. 42 Eventually, the
State Council approved the Regulation on DIS in March 2015.
The timing of the establishment of the DIS is quite tactical, focusing on a
period when China’s economy is less robust and the speed of development is
slowing down. At such time, there is potentially a greater risk of banks
encountering a liquidity crisis. The gradual establishment of shadow banking and
the private lending crisis also makes the DIS an indispensable shield to resist the
ever-increasing systemic risks in the banking sector. At the same time, while the
Chinese government has been constantly advancing financial innovation and
easing administrative controls over the financial industry, China’s financial
market is still largely viewed as highly predominated by governmental policies
and, therefore, further reforms are necessary to more profoundly free the
financial market and develop a more diversified banking structure. In this regard,
the establishment of the DIS is deemed a prerequisite to further other co-initiated
financial reform goals, including removing remaining controls on interest rates
and increasing the role of market forces in the financial industry’s operation so
that banks are allowed to fail if they are not well-operated or if they contain too
many risks. Judging from the status quo of China’s financial market and
examining the ambitious goals of China’s financial reform agenda, it can be
concluded that establishing a formal DIS is an urgent priority for China.
A. Interest Rate Marketization
“Interest rate marketization” refers to the removal of administrative restrictions
on interest rates and their fluctuations, and allowing the supply-demand
8:05PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-03/16/c_134071473.htm.
42
Guowuyuan Fazhi Bangongshi Guanyu Cunkuan Baoxian Tiaoli (Zhengqiu Yijian
Gao) Gongkai Zhengqiu Yijian de Tongzhi (国务院法制办公室关于《存款保险条例（
征求意见稿）》公开征求意见的通知) [Public Notice for Comments from the Legislative
Office of St. Council on Regulation of Deposit Insurance (Draft)], St. Council Gaz., Nov.
30,
2014,
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xwzx/tpxw/201411/20141100397756.shtml.
The
PBOC released the Cunkuan Baoxian Tiaoli (Zhengiu Yijian Gao) (存款保险条例(征求
意 见 稿 )) [Regulation of Deposit Insurance (Drafted Version for Comments) and
Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Guanyu Cunkuan Baoxian Tiaoli (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) de
Shuoming (中国人民银行关于《存款保险条例(征求意见稿)》的说明) [Instructions on
the Draft Regulation of Deposit Insurance System by the PBOC] (the “Instructions”), and
Cunkuan Baoxian Zhishi Zhuanjia Wenda (存款保险知识专家问答) [Q&A about
Deposit Insurance] (the “Q&A”), as further clarifications/ background information to
make sure that the public fully understand the contents and the rationale of the proposed
DIS.
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mechanism to play a determinant role in deciding their structure. China’s bank
deposit and lending rates have subject to stringent restrictions for a long time.
While this may have been reasonable when China was under the planned
economy regime, restrictions on interest rates have significantly impeded the
competitiveness of China’s banking industry with the advance of financial reform,
especially considering that most banks, including the Big-Four banks, have
completed their joint-stock system transformations and become listed banks.
Policymakers have set forth clear intentions to open China’s capital markets
and to halt direct policy interventions in setting interest rates. Basically, interest
rate marketization in China has adopted a three-step development strategy, from
the liberalization of the money market gradually moving to that of the bond
market and to deposit and lending rates. As early as 1996, the PBOC
promulgated The Decision on Removing the Cap on Inter-bank Borrowing
Interest Rates, marking an initial step towards liberalization of interest rates. 43
Meanwhile, China conducted deepened marketization reform on the issuance of
national bonds and the removal of caps on the inter-bank bond market interest
rate. The big moment came on October 29, 2004, when the PBOC completely
removed the upper limit of the lending rate and the lower limit of the deposit rate,
symbolizing that China achieved its interim goal along the path towards interest
rate marketization. 44
At a conference in November 2014, Hu Xiaolian, the former Deputy
Governor of the PBOC, announced that, since the beginning of 2014, important
measures had been taken to promote market-based interest rates:
The floating range of deposit rates was expanded from 1.1 times
to 1.2 times benchmark rates. Moreover, the maturity brackets of
deposit and lending interest rates were simplified to provide
more space for market pricing of interest rates, and to improve
the Shanghai inter-bank lending rate and market interest rate
self-regulatory pricing mechanism. 45
In June 2015, with the floating range of deposit rates rising up to 1.5 times

43

The People’s Bank of China, Report on Steady Progress in Market-based Interest Rate
Reform, Supplement to the China Monetary Policy Report (Jan. 2005),
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130721/2831321/index.html.
44
Id.
45
The People’s Bank of China, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the Caijing Magazine
Deputy
Governor
Hu
Xiaolian
(Dec.
16,
2014),
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130721/2873242/index.html.
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benchmark rates, the full completion of interest rate marketization was almost
realized.46
International experience has shown that in the course of interest rate
liberalization, many economies have undergone fluctuations or even financial
crises. There were some successful examples like the United States, Japan, Korea,
but also failed ones in some Latin American countries. In the United States, a
maximum deposit rate under “Regulation Q” was created in response to the Great
Depression. 47 Beginning in the late 1960s, as the inflation rate increased rapidly,
negative interest rates and financial disintermediation became very serious. In the
1970s, inflation caused the interest rates to rise above the limits mandated by
Regulation Q, investors started to seek out alternatives to traditional deposit
accounts. Money market funds were created to pool small investors’ funds to
purchase commercial paper. These money market funds operated without reserve
requirements or restrictions on rates of return and thus soon became popular
among small investors. With the aim of allowing banks and savings and loans to
compete with money market funds, the Depository Institution Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act was enacted in 1980, whereby the Federal Reserve
gradually removed the restrictions of “Regulation Q.”48 In 1986, when the upper
limit of the interest rate of a Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) account 49
was removed, the United States basically completed its interest rate
marketization.
The beginning of Japan’s official process of interest rate liberalization can
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China may free up bank deposit rates soon: central bank official, Reuters (Jun 3, 2015
10:09
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/04/us-china-economy-rates-idUSKBN0OK05I20
150604.
47
Regulation Q was created by the Banking Act of 1933 to prohibit the payment of
interest on demand deposits and to impose interest rate ceilings on various other types of
bank deposits, i.e. savings and time deposits. Regulation Q no longer exists now, all
remaining aspects of the regulation have been incorporated into Regulation D. See R.
Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What it Did and Why it Passed Away FED.
RESS.
BANK
OF
ST.
LOUIS
REV.
22-37
(1986),
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/86/02/Requiem_Feb1986.pdf.
48
Wei Liao & Sampawende J.-A. Tapsoba, China’s Monetary Policy and Interest Rate
Liberalization: Lessons from International Experiences, International Monetary Fund
Working
Paper
WP/14/75,
10
(2014),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1475.pdf.
49
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal Accounts, 12 C.F.R. § 390.297 (2015). (A NOW
account is a deposit account that pays interest on which an unlimited number of checks
may be written).
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be traced back to the establishment of an add hoc Yen/Dollar Committee between
the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the US Treasury in late 1983, which was
set up against the background of a large and widening trade imbalance between
the country. 50 In March 1985, Japan signed with the United States a Yen/Dollar
Report, which outlined important measures for Japan to deregulate its financial
market, including reforms like the removal of the upper limit of the fixed term
deposit interest rate and the removal of caps on the wholesale deposit interest
rate.51 Simultaneously, the MOF of Japan issued a report entitled The Present
Status of and Prospects for the Deregulation of Finance and Internationalization
of the Yen, in which the MOF emphasized the desirability and merits of financial
liberalization and internationalization of the yen. 52 By October 1994, Japan
basically achieved interest rate marketization.
Both the United States and Japan adopted a phased-in model to propel their
interest rate reform, which was accompanied by the development of financial
innovation and the expansion of direct financing. Nevertheless, interest rate
marketization also significantly influenced financial stability. As the financial
market became more liberalized, many financial institutions engaged in riskier
activities to gain higher profits. Taking the United States as an example, the
banking business changed considerably during the 1980s as risks increased due
to increased volatility of interest rates, as well as exchanges rates. From 1982
though 1991, more than 1,400 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
insured banks failed, including 131 that remained open only through FDIC
assistance. 53 However, with the enactment of The Financial Institution Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989, as a major reform of the
national DIS, the deposit insurance fund was reorganized and the insurance
coverage was expanded.54 The United States eventually came out of the Savings
and Loans (S&L) Crisis and entered a new era of financial development.
50

Shinji Takagi, Internationalising the Yen, 1984-2003: Unfinished Agenda or Mission
Impossible, in CURRENCY INTERNATIONALISATION: LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 77 (2011),
51
Id.
52
RICHARD B. FINN, U.S. – JAPAN RELATIONS: A SURPRISING PARTNERSHIP 83
(TRANSACTION PUBLISHERS, 1986).
53
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, A Brief History of Deposit Insurance in the
United States 50 (1998), at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/brief/brhist.pdf.
54
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989), http://legisworks.org/GPO/STATUTE-103-Pg183.pdf.
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Comparatively, Japan established its DIS in 1971, several years prior to its full
implementation of interest rate liberalization in preparation for offsetting
instabilities.
As the PBOC stated, deposit interest rate marketization would be completed
in the next one or two years as a critical change of China’s financial
infrastructure, since it would allow banks to offer higher interest rates to attract
funds that have recently been going into the riskier shadow banking system. This
institutional change was proposed as the final stage in the long-running financial
reforms that have sought to wean China off investment-driven growth that
depositors have subsidized in the form of low deposit interests. However, lessons
drawn from international practice affirm that deposit interest rate liberalization
will not land softly in China unless the DIS is established ex ante. A
well-designed DIS can help spur interest rate liberalization, especially involving
the still-regulated deposit rates, thereby encouraging innovation and providing
more options for consumers.
B. Private Bank Pilot Program
China has long been criticized for its highly concentrated banking sector that
is dominated by state-owed banks. Because the Xi Jinping Administration is
pushing changes that may be the most sweeping since Deng Xiaoping’s
liberalization in 1978 to loosen government controls over the banking industry,
China’s banking sector will perhaps embrace a fundamental change in the near
future. In March 2014, during the period of Lianghui,55 Chinese policymakers
approved a pilot program to establish five privately-owned banks as the
government sought to ease restrictions on the state-controlled banking industry.
According to the CBRC, China would allow these five banks to be set up in the
cities of Shanghai and Tianjin, and in provinces of Guangdong and Zhejiang, all
of which are developed areas in China. Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., Tencent
Holdings Ltd. and other privately-owned commercial tycoons are among the
private companies chosen to participate in this program.
The program will follow the principle of co-sponsors, which requires every
pilot bank to have at least two initiators. According to the CBRC, the selection
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Chinese National Lianghui (两会) [Two Sessions] is the period when the Annual
Meetings of the National Peoples’ Congress and the Chinese People Political
Consultative Conference are hosted together in Beijing.
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criteria of the five pilot banks are neither quota distribution under the planned
economy context, nor regional division under administrative management, but
“selecting [the] best of the best” from around the nation.56
In January 2015, the first two of the five pilot banks started their business.
The first one was WeBank, co-sponsored by Chinese Internet giant Tencent and
two other local firms in Shenzhen, which is the first online-only private bank in
China, named after Tencent’s popular mobile communication app, “WeChat.”
WeBank will have limited physical branches, with all of its consumer access, risk
controls and business management conducted online, and it expects that most
loans issued will be less than 1 million RMB. The intention is to avoid making
WeBank operate like traditional banks that own an enormous physical network
with a large balance sheet. The second pilot bank was Shanghai Huarui Bank,
which is registered in the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) of Shanghai with a capital of 3
billion RMB. The bank is approved to conduct a full range of banking services,
including deposits, lending, banking card issuance, foreign exchange, and bonds,
but it will mainly be aimed at serving small businesses in the FTZ. Both of these
newly approved private banks will make it easier for SMEs and entrepreneurs to
obtain loans. By June 2015, all other three pilot banks were established,
including Minshang Bank and Wangshang Bank in Zhejiang Province, and
Jincheng Bank in Tianjin.
In the long run, the establishment of private banks in China will have
significant implications. First, it will make the entry into the banking market
more flexible and will push structural reform of China’s banking industry. The
establishment of private banks will attract private capital into the current
state-dominated banking sector and accelerate restructuring and ownership
reform of the banking industry. Second, it will lower the costs for and deliver
practical benefits to small and medium clients. SMEs have become an important
impetus to China’s economic growth, but they have always faced fund-raising
56

The PBRC’s major considerations are: first, the bank should have institutional
arrangements to bear residual risks; second, the bank should have good qualifications and
anti-risk ability; third, the bank should have a sound internal corporate governance
mechanism; fourth, the bank should have differentiated market positioning and specific
strategies; fifth, the bank should have feasible risk resolution and recovery plan. See
Name List of the First Group of Pilot Private Banks at Their Own Risks Publicized,
CHINA
BANKING
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http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/EngdocView.do?docID=C309C49961B44D1B9704CA1CAA24E
D9E (last visited June 7, 2015).
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problems as banks traditionally prefer lending to state-owned and larger
enterprises. In bidding for the pilot program, many participating private
companies put forward a “small deposit, small lending” business motto, stating
that the private banks would mainly serve the needs of SMEs and local
communities. Hence, it can be expected that fund-raising for them would be
easier in the future. Third, it will encourage financial innovation and provide
diversified banking services. For instance, WeBank’s decision to operate its
business online will promote the development of internet finance and increase
public access to financial services.
There is a blueprint ahead of China’s ambitious agenda to restructure its
banking sector; however, the pilot program may become a dangerous trial if the
DIS is not in place. While market reactions to the establishment of private banks
are basically positive, there are still concerns over unsound corporate governance,
insufficiency of management capability, and risk control ability that private banks
may be confronted with. It is also possible that pilot banks can become financing
tools of their shareholders, incentivizing them to pursue riskier activities.
Therefore, the CBRC has been very cautious when pushing forward the pilot
program, and declares that it will implement strong prudential regulation over
already established private banks in accordance with state laws and international
standards. Meanwhile, the CBRC underscores the importance of establishing risk
management mechanisms to protect depositors and the significance of creating
resolution arrangements to make sure that if risks occur, private banks can be
closed in an orderly manner.57
Technically, the DIS was launched before the establishment of private banks,
which revealed Chinese policymakers’ concerns over the indifferentism and
skepticism of depositors who would have shown little interest or would have
casted doubts on the accountability of those banks. De facto, the launch of the
DIS is not only a signal to the public that China is about to accelerate its reforms
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The pilot banks must have adequate net capital, a specific business strategy and a
mechanism to prevent risks from spreading to protect depositors’ interests. They also
need to enact “living wills ” designed to ensure an orderly wind-down if going into
bankrupt. “Living Wills” are proposed by specific financial institutions as a risk
resolution mechanism established prior to occur of a failure. “Living Wills” are also
called “Resolution Plans” and are created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §165, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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towards a more diversified and inclusive banking industry, but also a
precondition for the pilot program to work. The DIS alleviates small depositors’
panic and hesitation about private banks in that it provides them with adequate
confidence that they will be equally reimbursed, just as when they use the big
banks. Without the deposit insurance in place, Chinese depositors would have
very limited incentives to try new out entrants, potentially dooming the reform
efforts of the pilot program before it even starts.
C. Market Exit Mechanism for Financial Institutions
Related to the liberalization of the interest rate and the implementation of
the private bank pilot program is the increasing possibility of bank failures in the
near future. Especially when all of these reforms are undertaken at the same time,
risks will accumulate rapidly in a short timeframe and China’s financial market is
not mature enough to resist these impacts. Judging from the HDB case, the
rescue of the Big-Four Banks and other bailout phenomenon that was previously
discussed, it is evident that China has not been able to set up a formal legal
framework to resolve failures of financial institutions. Because bailouts have
become increasingly costly nowadays and considering that still more private
banks are being set up, it would be impossible for the government to bear losses
of all these firms. Following the establishment of a DIS, setting up a
market-based exit mechanism for financial institutions will be the next goal in
China’s financial reform agenda.58
So far, China’s attempts to establish a market exit mechanism have not been
very successful. The main legislative bases for dealing with failures of financial
institutions are the Regulation on Closure of Financial Institutions, which was
proposed in 2001, and the Regulation on the Risk Disposal of Securities
Companies, which was launched in 2008. Both of these regulations were
promulgated by the State Council and are thus inferior to laws promulgated by
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.59 However, existing
58
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laws, such as the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, the Commercial Banks Law, and
the Law of Regulation of and Supervision over the Banking Industry, surprisingly
remain silent about the procedures for risk prevention and resolution of financial
institutions. Moreover, the two-abovementioned regulations are inadequate
because they only outline a rough picture of the closure procedures of banks and
securities companies, as well as the related administrative responsibilities and
mandates of policymakers. Furthermore, the two regulations mistakenly overlook
perhaps the most important issues in risk resolution: effectively reimbursing
vulnerable financial consumers like individual depositors, and making culpable
institutions bear losses for their failures while keeping the continuity of
fundamental financial functions. One of the reasons explaining this is,
conspicuously, the lack of a marketized DIS.
Due to the banking sector’s fundamental significance in the financial
industry, preferential considerations have been given to the design of a market
exit mechanism for banks in China, which is also regarded as the bank
insolvency regime led by the CBRC.60 The functioning of the bank insolvency
regime is closely related to the effectiveness of the DIS. The HDB case showed
that a bank run always occurs before the bank is doomed to be unresolvable. The
rumors of bank failure and the fear of depositors often incentivize them to
withdraw money in a short time, exacerbating the bank’s operating conditions
and reducing its prospects of being orderly resolved under a bank insolvency
regime. Essentially, without a clear-set DIS in place, many resolution techniques
designed in the bank insolvency regime may not even have chance to be
implemented.
A perfect example demonstrating how the DIS works seamlessly with a
bank insolvency regime comes from the United States. The FDIC is not only a
deposit insurer, but also a key architect responsible for bank insolvency. Before
closing a failed bank and paying out depositors, the FDIC has a number of
grounds to verify the resolvability of the bank. One of the most explicit grounds
60

The current bank rescue techniques used by the CBRC are recapitalization, mergers,
closure and debt-to-equity conversion, among others. The CBRC has been considering
enacting the Regulations on Bank Insolvency since 2005, when the third round of NPL
taking-over of the Big-Five banks were implemented. The establishment of the DIS paves
way for the CBRC in its future efforts in designing such a scheme. See Ping Xie, Bank
Restructuring in China,
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Policy Paper No.6,
124-129 (1999),
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is the capital-based condition under the “prompt correction action” (PCA),
adopted in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA) in 1991. According to this rule, a bank should become subject to
additional supervisory requirements if its capital continues to decline, and when
the capital is just equal to or less than 2% of its total assets, it will be defined as
“critically undercapitalized.”61 Once such a decision is made, a conservator or
receiver should be appointed within 90 days unless the bank returns to
going-concern values. 62 Two 90-day extensions of the PCA period can be
granted if the FDIC believes that these extensions would better protect relevant
shareholders or reduce losses of the deposit insurance fund (DIF). 63
Early intervention measures, like the PCA, are important characteristics of
the American bank insolvency regime. Moreover, under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (FDIA), the FDIC has complete power over the assets and
liabilities of the failed bank as soon as the FDIC is appointed as receiver.64 This
power allows the FDIC to arrange an immediate sale of assets and transfer
insured deposits to other banks. Such immediate sales limit the impact of the
failure on depositors, and since the FDIC is immediately vested with full
ownership over the assets, it can complete a sale as part of the initial resolution or
shortly afterward without awaiting court, creditor or shareholder approval. The
policy goal is to provide the FDIC with adequate authority and flexibility in
maximizing the prospects of recovery for the benefit of depositors and other
creditors. From this brief overview, we can see that there are no clear boundaries
between the DIS and the bank insolvency regime in the United States, and
together they form a coherent risk prevention and resolution framework for banks
and other depository institutions.
The necessity of establishing a bank insolvency regime in China further
compels the launch of the DIS, and the unveiling of the DIS is a strong sign
foreshadowing the launch of a formal bank insolvency regime in the very near
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12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1)(E). In 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1), FDICIA required federal
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future, perhaps in 2016. Because the legislative work of the two regimes are led
separately by the PBOC and the CBRC, potential conflicts between the two
regulatory watchdogs may create regulatory loopholes undermining the
effectiveness of both regimes. Therefore, there should be further regulations
arranging relative issues with respect to authority allocation and regulatory
cooperation. Still, no one will deny that the establishment of the DIS has paved
the way toward establishing a bank insolvency regime in China.
III.

FUNDAMENTALS OF CHINA’S DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
The Regulations contain 23 articles and formulate all basic elements that a

formal DIS should have, such as coverage, membership, premium rates and
funding arrangements. While the Regulations absorb common beneficial features
from deposit insurance schemes of other countries, especially the United States,65
they also reflect specific circumstances of the current situation of China’s
financial market. However, compared with schemes in other jurisdictions, the
Regulations are obviously too concise, thereby reducing the operability of the
proposed scheme and leaving some important unresolved issues that require
further clarifications. The key elements of the proposed Regulations are
introduced below, followed by a discussion of some issues with the clarity of the
elements.
A. Governance, Mandates and Powers
Most jurisdictions with an explicit DIS have a governing board type of
structure, known as the “deposit insurer.” According to a thematic review
conducted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2012, some deposit insurers
are dominated by representatives from the government (e.g. Russia), the banking
industry (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Germany), or the supervisor (e.g. Australia). 66
No matter what type of governance is adopted, deposit insurers should enjoy
independence as much as possible, both from the banking industry that is insured
65
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develop and expand cooperation between the two agencies regarding various aspects of
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and from the financial safety participants and other political influences. To this
end, deposit insurers should take a legal structure that allows its governing board
to make decisions and realize mandates independently.
Deposit insurers can choose among ex ante or ex post funding mechanisms.
Ex ante funding requires the accumulation and maintenance of a deposit
insurance fund (DIF) to cover insurance claims and related expenses prior to a
failure occurring. A deposit insurance fund is principally formed by insured
institutions through contributions, premiums, and other means. In ex post funding
systems, funds to cover insurance claims are collected from member institutions
when they fail and when the need to cover claims develops.67 Ex post systems
may be less onerous on member institutions when there are few failures of
limited magnitude because less premiums are collected, lowering administrative
costs associated with the collection of premiums and fund management.
To date, most jurisdictions have adopted an ex ante DIS funding structure
and have established deposit insurance funds. The Regulations makes clear from
the very beginning that deposit insurance is a system under which insured
depository institutions pay premiums to the Deposit Insurance Fund Management
Agency (DIFMA), thus forming a deposit insurance fund, and the DIFMA
reimburse depositors and take necessary measures to maintain the safety of the
deposits and the deposit insurance fund. 68 From this assertion, we know that
China also adopted an ex ante funding structure. The sources of the insurance
fund are: (i) premiums paid by insured institutions; (ii) properties received under
liquidation of insured institutions; (iii) income from the utilization of the fund;
and (iv) other legitimate income. 69 Article 11 of the Regulations further clarifies
that the utilization of the fund should be secure, and should preserve its liquidity
and value. Authorized utilization will be limited to: (i) being held by the PBOC;
(ii) investing in financial bonds and other senior bonds that have high credit
ratings, i.e. government bonds, central bank bills and highly-rated debentures;
and (iii) utilizing other methods approved by the State Council. 70
67

Luc Laeven, Pricing of Deposit Insurance, World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper No. 2871, at 3, at https://core.ac.uk/download/files/153/6719598.pdf.
68
See Cunkuan Baoxian Tiaoli (存款保险条例) [Regulation on Deposit Insurance]
(promulgated by St. Council, Oct. 29, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) St. Council Gaz.,
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Id., art. 6.
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According to the Regulations, the DIFMA will be established as the primary
agency responsible for the operation of the deposit insurance fund. 71 The
Regulations do not clarify the formation, structure or administration of the
DIFMA but states that all such issues will be decided by the State Council.
However, the Regulations do set out responsibilities that the DIFMA will have,
including: (i) formulate and publish rules related to the fulfillment of their
mandates; (ii) formulate and adjust the criteria of premiums rates and refer to the
State Council for approval; (iii) determine the applicable rates of each insured
institution; (iv) collect premiums; (v) administer and utilize the deposit insurance
fund; (vi) undertake early corrective actions and risk resolution measures; (vii)
reimburse depositors timely; and (viii) carry out other mandates approved by the
State Council. 72
Moreover, the DIFMA will be granted other powers essential for it to realize
its responsibilities. First, it will have the authority to examine the following
aspects of insured institutions: (i) the changes of the risk profile and other
conditions of insured institutions, in order to make adjustments on applicable
premium rates; (ii) the size, structure and integrity of the deposits of insured
institutions, in order to decide if there are any problems with the assessment base
of their premiums; and (iii) the integrity of the information reported by insured
institutions.73 The DIFMA should inform the CBRC if serious problems about
insured institutions are detected. Second, the DIFMA can propose risk alerts to
insured institutions if it finds capital inadequacy and other circumstances that
adversely affect the safety of the deposit insurance fund or of insured deposits. 74
Third, when insured institutions’ capital adequacy ratios are greatly reduced due
to massive asset losses or other factors, under which the safety of the deposit
insurance fund or the insured deposits are seriously compromised, the institutions
should take timely measures to supplement their capital, control asset growth and
massive transactions, and reduce leverage ratios. 75 The DIFMA can impose
higher rates on institutions that fail to improve the situation. 76 Fourth, the
DIFMA can require institutions to take corrective measures in a limited
71
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time-frame if they: (i) do not pay adequate premiums; (ii) do not report
information to the DIFMA or report mendacious information; (iii) reject or
hinder the DIFMA’s fulfillment of its mandates; or (iv) hinder the utilization of
the DIF. 77 The DIFMA also has the authority to publicize the names of culpable
institutions’ directors and other directly responsible individuals. 78
Surprisingly, although the Regulations touch on some of the main
responsibilities of the DIFMA, they remain silent about the nature, legal form,
structure, administration and personnel of this ambiguous yet fundamental new
regulatory body. Currently, the PBOC (specifically the Financial Stability Bureau
under the PBOC) is provisionally designated as the DIFMA by the State Council,
and as such PBOC is primarily responsible for the management of the deposit
insurance fund. As part of further implementation of the DIS, a new independent
agency may be established in the future. Theories about the operation of the
probable new agency vary. First, it could operate as a bureau under the CBRC so
as to provide better and prompt protection to depositors; second, it could become
an internal body under the PBOC, as the PBOC has been leading the legislative
work of the DIS; or third, the DIFMA could be established outside of the PBOC
and the CBRC to ensure that it has full competency and independence to fulfill
its mandates. 79 Under the third speculated theory, the DIFMA will resemble
China’s National Council for Social Security Fund (NCSSF).80 The DIFMA
should be led directly by the State Council and should be able to operate
independently without being subject to any external interference from the PBOC,
the CBRC and other regulatory bodies, but instead should work cooperatively
with them. The board of the DIFMA can be comprised of directors of each of the
principal Chinese regulatory bodies. This design feature will create a
counterbalanced atmosphere among different safety net participants. Although
the appropriate form of the DIFMA is yet to be seen by the future implementation
77
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of the DIS, it is largely foreseeable that the introduction of the DIFMA will
gradually incentivize China to conduct deeper reforms on the institutional design
of banking regulation.
B.

Mandatory Membership

At least two questions arise concerning membership in the DIS, namely: (i)
what types of financial institutions should be included?; and (ii) should
membership be voluntary or compulsory? 81 “Fundamentally, all financial
institutions that accept deposits from the public [] or might directly or indirectly
represent a risk for the stability of the financial intermediation system should be
included in the deposit insurance.”82 Also, opinion is largely united today that
membership for all financial intermediaries who meet the above criteria must be
obligatory, as the IADI Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems
states, “Membership in a deposit insurance system should be compulsory for all
banks.” 83 Voluntary membership will lead to adverse selection or increased
moral hazard.
According to the Regulations, China makes the deposit insurance
compulsory for all depository-taking institutions, including the state-controlled
banks, joint-stock banks, and foreign lenders. Article 2 of the Regulations states
that all commercial banks, rural cooperative banks, rural credit cooperatives and
other depository institutions established in the territory of the People’s Republic
of China should pay premiums and be incorporated into the deposit insurance
scheme. 84 Notably, however, foreign banks’ branches in China and Chinese
institutions’ overseas branches are not subject to the DIS, except in situations
where China has established special arrangements with the requisite
jurisdictions.85
One of the barriers to the establishment of the DIS in the past was the
opposition from the Big-Five state-owned banks, which are the Big-Four Banks
plus the Bank of Communications. As they had been granted implicit funding
support, they would definitely be reluctant to participate in the DIS, as it would
increase their costs. However, even though China’s banking industry has become
81
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an increasingly less-concentrated market with the surge in the number of banks,
the Big-Five Banks still have pivotal importance to the whole banking industry
and account for an enormous market share in many aspects. For example, both
shares of total assets and total liabilities of the Big-Five Banks exceeded 40% of
shares of all commercial banks in the first quarter of 2014.86 Therefore, if the
Big-Five Banks were absent from the DIS, the effectiveness of the DIS would be
seriously devalued.
As for the treatment of domestic branches of foreign banks and the foreign
branches of domestic banks, some jurisdictions adopt “the principle of
territoriality,” whereby only branches established in the home country would be
insured, thus excluding foreign branches of domestic banks (Switzerland and
Hong Kong are examples of this). 87 Other jurisdictions adopt “the principle of
personality” and cover all domestic depository institutions whose parent
institutions are established in the home country, and all of their domestic and
overseas branches, but exclude local branches of foreign banks, as is the case of
the United States.88 There are also jurisdictions adopting both principles, such as
Germany, France, and many other European Economic Area (EEA) member
states.89 According to the PBOC, China’s option largely reflects international
common practice. While this design is reasonable, as China has just begun to
implement its DIS, it may also be risky for foreign branches of Chinese banks
that are incorporated in a host country adopting “the principle of personality,”
meaning those branches would be not be covered by any deposit insurance
scheme. This may bring instability to both China and relative host countries.
Therefore, as China’s DIS matures, an extension of the membership to foreign
branches of domestic banks will provide a higher level of protection. Conversely,
to attract investment from foreign banks and improve the competitiveness of
China’s banking industry, membership extension could also be given to domestic
branches of foreign banks, so long as foreign authorities incorporate Chinese
86
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banks’ overseas branches into their deposit insurance schemes accordingly.
C.

Limited but High-Level of Coverage

The core purpose of every DIS is to protect the interests of retail depositors
and reduce the possibility of bank runs should a bank failure occur. Although a
high-coverage level reduces the incentive for depositors to participate in a bank
run, adequate compensatory controls are needed to ensure a proper balance
between financial stability and market discipline. Therefore, most DISs in the
world have adopted a limited scope of insurance coverage that covers the
majority of depositors, but they have also left a substantial amount of deposits
exposed to risks. However, as stipulated by contingent arrangements in response
to the global financial crisis of 2007-08, many jurisdictions raised their insurance
coverage limit, while many countries, e.g. France and Germany, also introduced a
temporary blanket deposit guarantee. 90 In the aftermath of the crisis, these
countries established credible plans to transition from the blanket guarantee back
to the limited insurance coverage, but most jurisdictions had revised their
schemes and remarkably raised coverage limits.
China will adopt a limited insurance coverage. The DIS will insure deposits
of as much as 500,000 RMB (approximately $80,000). In consultation with
relevant departments of the State Council, the PBOC has the authority to adjust
the coverage amount in line with economic development and changes of deposit
structures and financial risks, and, accordingly, implement a new coverage
amount upon the State Council’s approval. 91 The Regulations adopt a “per
depositor per bank” approach, which means the total amount of principal and
interest of all insured accounts of a depositor in an insured institution will be
fully reimbursed if they are within the range of the coverage limit. Any amount
surpassing this ceiling will be exposed to the banks’ solvency risk, but can also
be reimbursed from the liquidating assets of the insured banks under bankruptcy
proceedings. After reimbursing the depositors their insured, the DIFMA will be
deemed as having obtained the creditor’s rights with the same priority of the
depositor against the insured institution within the scope of reimbursement. 92
According to the PBOC’s estimation based on data recorded through 2013,
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the insured amount proposed will be high enough to cover all bank deposits of
99.6% of depositors in China, meaning the majority of depositors will be fully
protected. 93 This maximum protection amount is equal to 12 times GDP per
capita, which is considerably higher than the schemes in other countries (2-5
times GDP per capita). Part of the reason is that Chinese depositors have a higher
propensity to save. To a very large extent, deposits play the role that is provided
by the social security system. The 500,000 RMB cap covers not only household
depositors, but also corporate depositors, especially SMEs.
Besides the proportion of insured depositors, coverage of a DIS also
includes the value of eligible deposits covered. Most DISs cover a broad variety
of deposits, including secure demand deposits, fixed-term deposits and
non-resident deposits. Some DISs also cover foreign currency deposits, deposits
of nonfinancial companies, and public sector entities. 94 The Regulations do not
clarify specific types of insured deposits, but states that all RMB deposits and
foreign currency deposits of an insured institution will be protected.

95

Nonetheless, interbank deposits by other financial institutions, deposits by senior
management to their own bank, and other uninsured deposits defined by the
DIFMA are not covered by the DIS.96 It could be reasonably speculated that
Chinese DIS will provide protection to all RMB and foreign currency demand
and fixed-term deposits and non-residents deposits, as compliant to international
common practice. Interbank deposits and deposits of senior management in the
same insured banks are excluded to reduce risks and moral hazard. Interbank
activities largely incorporate shadow banking businesses, a significant factor
contributing to the current fragility of China’s financial system. Interbank
activities contain high risks, investors in interbank deposits are normally
institutions or individuals who have expertise coinciding with their ability to
assume risks, and thus they are excluded by the DIS.
The proposed coverage limit could meet China’s current need. It is wide
enough to fully payout the majority of Chinese depositors; therefore, the
transition from the implicit DIS to explicit DIS will have very limited influences
93
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on retail depositors. As China is still under a stage of stable economic
development, chances of bank insolvency are quite small. Even if banks
encounter distress, regulators will have other techniques available to make sure
depositors are immune to fluctuations. Even if serious risks are met, regulators
could temporarily apply a blanket deposit scheme to protect depositors, just as
they have been doing under the implicit DIS.
D. Pricing Mechanism
Sound funding arrangements are critical to the effectiveness of a DIS.
Deposit insurers can choose either a flat-rate premium or a system that
differentiates premiums on the basis of individual bank risk profiles. A flat-rate
system is easier to be understood and administered but does not differentiate
among banks with different risk exposures. 97 A risk-adjusted system may help to
mitigate moral hazard by imposing differentiated rates on institutions appearing
to have different risk profiles, but may also be more pro-cyclical.98
While most jurisdictions are still using flat rates, many countries have
adopted risk-adjusted rates. From the founding of the FDIC in 1933 until 1991,
all banks in the United States paid the same rate. The result was that better run
banks subsidized those banks with a much higher risk profile. In 1991, the FDIC
adopted a risk-based premium system. 99 The initial risk-based pricing system
only relied on supervisory ratings and capital ratios. In 2006, restrictions on the
FDIC’s ability to assess premiums when the deposit insurance fund exceeded a
certain level were eliminated, and differentiated methodologies were established
for small banks (assets less than $10 billion) and large banks (assets greater than
$10 billion). For smaller banks, a methodology using six financial ratios plus
supervisory ratings was adopted and, with other minor modifications, this
remains the basis of the small bank risk-based pricing system today. 100 For larger
97
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banks, the FDIC initially adopted a system based upon capital levels, supervisory
ratings and debt issuer ratings to reflect these views of relative risks. 101
The financial crisis of 2007-08 proved the insufficiency of the above
approach, as it failed to reflect increasing differences in risk profiles among big
banks. Meanwhile, the emergency measures used to save big financial
institutions during the crisis greatly reduced the amount of the deposit insurance
fund, thus calling for modifications to reform the way the DIS was run. In this
context, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the
Dodd-Frank Act) was enacted in July 2010, which remarkably empowered the
FDIC by giving it much greater discretion to manage the deposit insurance fund
and reform the pricing mechanism of the American DIS.
A major reform of the Dodd-Frank Act with regard to the funding and
pricing of the DIS was the Designated Reserve Ratio (DRR). The DRR refers to
the balance of the Deposit Insurance Fund “divided by estimated insured
deposits.”102 From 2007 to 2010, before the Dodd-Frank Act was introduced, the
DRR was fixed at 1.25%.103 The Dodd-Frank Act raised the minimum DRR,
which the FDIC is required to set each year, from 1.15% to 1.35%.104 After the
Dodd-Frank reform, the DRR was fixed at 2.00%, from 2011 to 2015.105 Another
major reform of the Dodd-Frank Act was the Assessment Base. Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC amended its regulations to redefine the base used for
calculating deposit insurance assessments. Before the Dodd-Frank reform, the
assessment base was the total domestic deposits of insured depository institutions
since 1935.106 Under the newly promulgated regulations, the assessment base of
a depository institution must, with some possible exceptions, “equal the average
consolidated total assets of [such] insured depository institution during the
assessment period minus [its] average tangible equity . . . during the assessment
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period.”107 From then on, all depository institutions need to report their average
consolidated total assets on a daily basis. The last major reform of the
Dodd-Frank Act was the Assessment Rate. The changes to the assessment base
made it necessary to change assessment rates. Most importantly, under the new
risk-based premium rules implemented by the Dodd-Frank Act, there were
adjustments to rates for types of funding that either posed heightened risk to the
deposit insurance fund or that helped to offset risks to the deposit insurance
fund. 108 In other words, institutions that pose higher risks to the deposit
insurance fund—for example, by holding unsecured debt issued by another
insured institution—must pay a higher rate.
In Europe, an analysis made in 2008 of the deposit insurance fund in 27
European Union (EU) member states showed that a risk-based premium system
had only been introduced in 11 countries (i.e. Germany, France, Italy), and only
seven of them were based on ex ante supply of a deposit insurance fund. 109 The
reason why so few countries adopted risk-based premium rates, even though the
positive effects of risk-based pricing mechanism are largely uncontested, can be
traced back to the fact that the European Council Directive (EC) 94/19 on
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (Directive 94/19/EC) had remained silent on this
issue and left the design of pricing models to each member state. A new Directive
2009/14 explicitly recommends the introduction of risk-based premium models,
but does not address specific aspects of the model to be applied. 110
The United States took nearly 60 years to transition to a risk-based pricing
mechanism. Many European countries started risk-based pricing model only
recently, and most other countries in the world still have not incorporated
risk-based approach into their DISs. This reflects some echoes that China should
107

12 C.F.R. § 327.5(a) (2015).
FDIC,
Assessment,
Large
Bank
Pricing,
final
rule,
32,
at
https://www.fdic.gov/news/board/2011rule1.pdf.
109
Unit G09, Eur. Comm’n Directorate Gen. Joint Research Ctr., Risk-Based
Contributions in EU Deposit Guarantee Schemes: Current Practices, at 9-10 (June 2008),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/risk-based-report_en.pdf.
110
Directive 2009/14/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
2009 amending Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes as Regards the
Coverage Level and the Payout Delay, 2009 O.J. (L 68/3). (On June 12, 2014, the
European Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive has been recast and it requires each EU
member state to modify its savings protection schemes to meet the improved EU deposit
protection rules. Most rules must be implemented by July 3, 2015 at the latest). See
Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (Recast) (Text with EEA Relevance), 2014 O.J. (L 173/149).
108

81

Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.

Vol. XVI

not be overhasty to adopt a risk-based model, especially when the risk
assessment system and supervisory rating system are both very immature.
Therefore, the Regulations states that the premium rates are consisted of a
benchmark rate and a risk-based rate.111 At the initial stage, only the benchmark
rate will be used, all institutions will be charged at an equal level. Later, when
supporting regulations and techniques are being established, the risk-based rate
will be effective and insured institutions will also be charged in a differentiated
manner to reflect each institution’s risk profile. Criteria for premium rates are
decided and subject to adjustment by the DIFMA in line with changes of
economic and financial development, deposit structure, and the accumulated
adequacy of the deposit insurance fund, which will be implemented under
approval of the State Council. 112
The Governor of the PBOC, Zhou Xiaochuan, stated in a recent interview
that the initial benchmark rates will be set between 0.01% and 0.02%, which is
significantly lower than that of most countries, hence the reason that the likely
impacts on insured institutions are deemed “very small.” Premiums will not
become a burden to insured institutions in the long run. On the contrary, they will
benefit from the DIS inasmuch as the possibilities of bank runs will be greatly
reduced. Nevertheless, the PBOC doesn’t give a specific starting date or release
any details about when and how to transition to the risk-based pricing mechanism.
Based on the risk profiles of different types of depository institutions, big
state-owned banks will likely enjoy lower rates than their smaller counterparts,
because the latter often contain higher risk profiles and weaker capital conditions.
In order to increase public confidence towards the newly launched DIS, and to
offset the inequality among big and small institutions, more detailed regulations
on the risk assessment methodologies should be devised, so as to make sure the
insured institutions go through the transitional period smoothly.
E. Reimbursing Depositors
A well-designed DIS should reimburse depositors fully and promptly, with a
clear and unequivocal trigger for depositor reimbursement. Regrettably, the
Regulations only provide a very broad and general description about
reimbursement without setting clear payout procedures and timelines. The
111
112
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DIFMA is required to reimburse depositors in one of the following ways: (i)
directly pay out depositors; (ii) order other eligible insured institutions to pay out
depositors on behalf of the DIFMA; or (iii) provide guarantee, loss allocation or
funding support to other eligible insured institutions, in order for them to buy or
assume all or part of businesses, assets and liabilities of the institutions that are
taken over, closed, or have filed for bankruptcy protection. 113 The DIFMA
should follow the “minimum cost” principle when deciding specific ways to
utilize the deposit insurance fund. The Regulations also make clear that, when
one of the following conditions is met, depositors have the right to require the
DIFMA to reimburse them where (i) the DIFMA is designated as the receiver of
the insured institution; (ii) the DIFMA implements liquidation of the insured
institution; (iii) the Court adjudicates to accept insured institution’s file for
bankruptcy; or (iv) other situations approved by the State Council.114
To ease market panic driven by the failure of a bank, it is important that the
DIS set in advance a clear process to promptly reimburse depositors. The design
of the reimbursement process should at least cover the following basics: (i)
reimbursement trigger; (ii) reimbursement period; and (iii) how and when the
deposit insurer receives deposit information. As to the conditions that trigger a
claim for reimbursement, international practice includes court-declared
bankruptcy, the decision of the supervisory agency, or a combination of them. 115
The legally required timeframe to reimburse depositors ranges from “as soon as
possible” as in the United States to a maximum allowed time. 116 EU member
states are legally obliged to reimburse depositors within twenty business days
(extendable to thirty business days by regulators or deposit insurers). As part of
its effort to create a safer and sounder financial system and a uniformed banking
union, the European Commission has proposed changes to existing European
rules to further improve protection to depositors. One of the changes is easier and
faster payouts, where repayment deadlines will be gradually reduced from the
current twenty business days to seven business days in 2024.117 Germany has
113
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completed quick steps to follow this requirement by introducing a new deposit
insurance law. Starting May 31, 2016, the maximum timeframe allowable for
depositors to be paid out will drop from the current twenty business days to seven
business days.118 In jurisdictions where the deposit insurer is not legally obliged
to reimburse depositors within a specific timeframe, such as in Australia and
Brazil, the authorities have publicly committed to a timeframe that targets to
demonstrate their commitment. 119
As for the deposit information access, some deposit insurers receive
information from supervisory authorities when they consider it necessary to
trigger reimbursement.120 As soon as the trigger is likely to take place, deposit
insurers are expected to receive or request the information from insured
institutions to prepare for the reimbursement. In other jurisdictions, such as the
United States, information is received on a regular basis directly from member
institutions and is used to construct a single customer view on an ongoing
basis.121
Drawing lessons from international experience, further clarifications in
China’s DIS are expected to set up clear triggering conditions and timeframe to
orderly and promptly reimburse depositors. As regards the information access,
Article 10 of the Regulations articulates that insured institutions are required to
report insured deposits, deposit structure and other information essential for
calculating premium rates and paying out deposits on a regular basis, showing
that China will adopt the United States mode with regard to deposit information
access.
F.

Coordination with Other Financial Safety Net Players

Coordination and cooperation with other elements of financial safety
networking are important for maintaining an effective DIS. The experience of the
recent financial crisis confirms that the safety-net participants, including
prudential regulation, deposit insurance and the central bank, can inspire
118

On Nov. 19, 2014, the German Bundestag has adopted the Deposit Guarantee Scheme
Implementation Act (Gesetz zur Umsetzung der europäischen Richtlinie über
Einlagensicherungssysteme). Most rules of this regulation will enter into force on July 3,
2015. However, some elements will be effective earlier, on the day after its enactment.
See http://www.dw.de/germany-gets-new-deposit-insurance-law/a-18072954 (last visited
Aug. 5, 2015).
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confidence in market participants necessary to resist a crisis only by cooperating
and making well founded joint decisions. It is essential to establish an
institutionalized, formalized and permanent mechanism to improve information
exchange among those safety-net participants.
The Regulations, though it does not touch the rationale of how the DIFMA
will be located and organized, underscores the essential role that it would play in
the safety net. It is required that the DIFMA participate in the Financial
Regulation Coordination Mechanism (FRCM), and establish information sharing
arrangements with the PBOC, the CBRC and other related regulatory bodies. 122
The DIFMA should be able to use the information-sharing techniques to obtain
critical information of institutions’ risk profiles, and to examine report and rating
conditions. The DIFMA could also ask institutions to report other information if
received information fail to meet their regulatory needs.
Despite this, the DIFMA also has the authority to suggest that the CBRC can
take over, restructure, or close an insured institution if conditions formulated
under article 38 and article 39 of the Law of Regulation of and Supervision on
the Bank Industry are met, which are (i) where an institution is experiencing or is
likely to experience a credit crisis, thereby seriously jeopardizing the lawful
rights and interests of depositors; or (ii) where an institution operates in violation
of laws or is not operated or managed properly, thereby seriously threatening
financial order and undermining public interests. 123 Through this method, the
DIFMA and the CBRC will be able to detect problems in banking sector before
they pose serious risks to the overall financial system.
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The FRCM was established in Aug. 2013, as a coordinating scheme among Chinese
financial regulatory bodies to reinforce regulation in the financial sector. It resembles the
Financial Stability Oversight Council of the United States established by the Dodd-Frank
Act, who has broad authorities in risk identifying and monitoring, large financial
conglomerates regulation and resolution and financial coordination. However,
comparably, the FRCM is not a decision-making body but rather a coordinating platform
for relevant regulatory bodies to share information and coordinate actions, without
altering their existing regulatory functions. It is led by the PBOC and will involve
chairmen of the CBRC, the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission), CIRC
(China Insurance Regulatory Commission) and SAFE (State Administration of Foreign
Exchange). If necessary, the NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission),
the country’s top economic planner, and the MOF will also be invited to take part in the
meetings. See Xiao Xu, China State Council Launched New Financial Coordination
Mechanism,
NAT.
L.
REV.,
available
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http://www.natlawreview.com/article/china-state-council-launched-new-financial-coordin
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IV. THE LIKELY IMPACTS OF CHINA’S DEPOSIT INSURANCE
The DIS is being introduced in China at a time when the economy and the
financial market are less robust and there are greater risks accumulating in the
financial industry. China’s economy is poised for the weakest expansion since
1990s and policymakers have reduced the economic growth target. 124 The
banking sector is about to experience a fundamental transition from a
government-backed guarantee to a more modernized and liberalized developing
mode. Absent a DIS, authorities will face difficulty in undertaking further
reforms. Simply put, as a symbol of modern financial system, the DIS will
significantly reshape China’s banking regulation and risk resolution pattern, as
well as accompanying other expected and unexpected consequences. Compared
with the very widely accepted influences of the DIS in other jurisdictions, the
introduction of the DIS in China may provide different echoes that adequately
capture Chinese authorities’ motivation for introducing such a scheme. This part
will discuss the potential impacts of a DIS on the financial industry, the banking
regulatory design and the depositors in China.
A. The Impact on the Financial Industry
Chinese authorities refrained from introducing deposit insurance in the
earlier years of financial reform. But now they are proposing to face what must
be considered a calculated risk in explicating the DIS in the presence of
country-wide evidences that such a scheme sometimes fails to achieve expected
containment of crisis frequency. Despite the many warning signs, it is likely that
the establishment of the DIS will affect the following aspects of the financial
industry.
1.

Financial Stability

A major argument in favor of deposit insurance is that it maintains and
promotes financial stability by preventing inefficient bank runs arising from
asymmetric information and self-fulfilling prophecies. 125 Depositors, retail
depositors in particular, only have incomplete information about banks’ financial
conditions and hence may run on banks in anticipation of failures. Explicit
deposit insurance effectively removes the depositors’ haze in this respect. The
124

Neil Gough, China Lowers Official Economic Growth Target, N.Y. TIMES, at A1
(Mar. 4, 2015).
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See Douglas Diamond & Philip Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,
91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 403 (1983).
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recent financial crisis revealed the importance of deposit insurance as a key
element to ease depositors’ anxiety. Some authorities increased the insurance
coverage or even provided a blanket guarantee. These interventions came at a
cost, but all in all prevented widespread bank runs from deteriorating the whole
financial system. China will be no exception. Should an explicit DIS be in place,
bank runs that occurred in HDB case or many other situations would become
history forever.
Additionally, deposit insurance also enhances financial stability by
co-constructing an effective market exit mechanism for banks. The deposit
insurer is a key moderator in bank crisis management and resolution. Experience
shows that liquidation can be a serious inferior way of handling bank failures. 126
This is because liquidation can entail a destruction of values, disruption to the
provision of services, and other spillovers to the rest of the financial system.
Some of that can be avoided if, instead, it is able to transfer the insured deposits
and good assets to another well-functioning institution, which are the so-called
assets taking-over through “bridge bank” mechanism. 127 Deposit insurance can
effectively aide this strategy by injecting funding resources, up to but not beyond
the expected amount to pay off insured depositors in liquidation. In this way,
banks’ critical financial services such as the payment and clearing systems will
not be unnecessarily interrupted. In the case of a bank being taken over, being
closed down or filing for bankruptcy, regulators have the first hand to utilize the
deposit insurance fund to provide supports to other eligible institutions to take
over the failing bank’s good assets and businesses. Consequently, depositors’
insured deposits will be transferred to a well-operating institution. In this way,
deposit insurance will effectively promote banks’ failure resolution.
However, it is important to note that deposit insurance is not a cure for
financial crisis. The recurring financial turbulences that took place in the past
decades demonstrate that the ability of deposit insurance to deliver favorable
results in maintaining financial stability is very inadequate. Historic records show
126

The bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers led to some destructive outcomes that
could have been avoided if a more effective rescue mechanism existed in 2008. See
generally Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc. under the Dodd-Frank Act, FDIC QUARTERLY, Vol. 5, No.2
(2011).
127
The basic resolution strategy behind it is to break up a bank into a good and bad bit,
and effect a sale of the economically critical parts.
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that there are no necessary connections between the establishment of the DIS and
the occurrence of banking crisis. 128 The DIS, when not properly designed, can
even lead to financial turmoil in practice. Therefore, the significance of the DIS is
not to eliminate possibilities of bank runs or insolvencies, but to, through early
regulatory interventions, manifest the risks gathered in banking industry.
The establishment of the DIS will have great impacts on Chinese banks’
internal governance and operating strategy will cause certain potential problems.
Banks have to shift from traditional ways of deriving profits from the spread
between deposits and loans, to a modernized multiple profit mode. 129 Moreover,
the shadow-banking sector, which has long been considered as a major impetus
for China’s financial market and economy, will be excluded from the protection
by the DIS. While this will help to strengthen market discipline, it also leaves
room for future risks if a comprehensive framework for dealing with shadow
banking crisis has not been established. All these considerations may add
uncertainty to the function of China’s DIS in maintaining financial stability.
All in all, the DIS is currently introduced in China simultaneously with interest
rates liberalization, banking industry structural reform and many other tough
reforms. International experience from the United States, Japan and Europe
demonstrates that in this transitional period, greater vigilance should be given to
the institutional design and phase-in implementation of the DIS. Chinese
policymakers and regulators should intensify their supervision over the insured
institutions as new reforms grant them expanded powers to chase rapid growth.
Because China’s financial system is so large and vulnerable, the costs could be
very high if the gamble of introducing the DIS does not pay off.
2.

Moral Hazard Concerns

Implementing deposit insurance is a tightrope act. On the one hand, an
explicit DIS can significantly reduce the incidence of bank runs. On the other
hand, an explicit DIS can fuel bank crises by giving banks incentives to take
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Tianyong Guo & Shuangshuang Liu, Deposit Insurance System is a Double-edged
Sword, 1 CHINA REP. 50, 51(2015).
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No doubt that deposit insurance will cause banks’ funding costs to rise. In fact,
Chinese banks already are battling with the potential for thinner profit margins after the
PBOC cut interest rates in late Nov. 2014 for the first time since 2012. Because the central
bank cut benchmark lending rates more than it cut rates on deposits, the difference between
how much banks charge borrowers and how much they pay depositors could narrow
sharply, pressuring profits.
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unnecessary risks. The United States’ experience in the 1980s and early 1990s
suggests that any country that adopts an explicit deposit insurance must grapple
with the destabilizing effects on the country’s financial system. 130 This problem,
known as “moral hazard,” was perhaps the biggest concern driving many
jurisdictions to adopt an explicit DIS.
Academia argues that deposit insurance can lead to moral hazard in at least
two ways. First, under the government’s guarantee, especially an explicit
guarantee, the insured institutions would be willing to take more risks because
they can capture profits while passing along losses to the government. 131 Second,
the government cannot implement risk-preventing measures, because the insured
institutions have no incentives to comply, knowing that the government will bail
them out.132 In addition, should a DIS be in place, depositors, creditors and
shareholders do not suffer the full consequences of a institution’s failure, and
therefore, are less likely to monitor the institution’s condition. As Professor
William Lovett put it, “if governments and modern nations do not allow most
banks to [fail], how can the leaders and managements of banking institutions be
disciplined and avoid unduly risky, negligent, or adventurous lending policies (or
simply poor asset-liability management)?”133
Far from being a mere theoretical concern, moral hazard in explicit deposit
insurance is significant and quite real. Worldwide, explicit deposit insurance
increases the likelihood of bank crises significantly. Combining deposit insurance
with interest rate liberalization makes moral hazard even worse because it
permits banks to chase high-yield investments carrying heightened risk. 134
Despite the common view that explicit deposit insurance will contribute to
moral hazard in banking industry, an explicit DIS may have the opposite effect in
China by enhancing market discipline. 135 First, implicit DIS is de facto a
130
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complete guarantee and therefore provides a higher level of protection than
explicit DIS. By replacing the implicit DIS with an explicit one, Chinese
policymakers shift from granting full guarantee to all banking accounts to a
rather limited portion of accounts. The majority of depositors will still receive the
same protection, where the wholesale depositors face uncertainty in being fully
reimbursed and will definitely have more incentives to keep an eye on banks’
ongoing operation. Second, from banks’ perspective, they will be charged a
certain amount of premiums to form a deposit insurance fund, which they are not
obliged to under the implicit deposit insurance. Third, retail household depositors
will start to discipline banks’ behaviors, because the establishment of DIS
fundamentally overturns their strong philosophy that all bank insolvencies will be
backed up by the government. In short, China’s explicit DIS will not make big
movements in enhancing the safety and soundness of the banking system. Rather,
the significance of China’s DIS is to expose the risks in banking industry and
encourage market participants to focus on the management of banks.
Therefore, China’s financial market may not be poisoned by the moral
hazard brought by the explicit DIS, as has happened in other jurisdictions. As the
implementation of the DIS goes further and deeper, market participants will relax
their vigilance and become reluctant to pay attention to the banks’ operation.
Therefore, future institutional design of China’s DIS should make adjustments to
the moral hazard concern as well.
3.

Level Playing Field

As previously analyzed, China’s banking system is dominated by the
state-owned banks. Since China has not established floating interest rates among
its banks, it is of depositors’ natural perception that the Big-Four banks enjoy an
implicit guarantee from the government during financial distress and are
therefore more trustworthy. As a result, compared with the developed financial
market countries, China’s banking system remains highly monopolistic with very
few private small and medium-sized depository institutions.
The establishment of the explicit DIS may open the gate for the prolific
development of small and medium-sized depository institutions, which are
considered as the biggest beneficiaries supported by deposit insurance. As the
private bank pilot program continues to expand, the number of small and
be Viewed This Way, 1 MODERN BANKERS 56, 57 (2015) [in Chinese].
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medium-sized private banks is likely to grow. Deposit insurance can to a large
extent enhance the creditworthiness and competitiveness of small and
medium-sized banks and create a level playing field. Moreover,

deposit

insurance provides small and medium-sized banks with a steady and robust
market environment to operate their business through strengthening depositor
confidence, as depositors will be equally reimbursed wherever they arrange their
deposits. In the long run, deposit insurance will propel structural reform in
China’s banking industry and help form a more diversified banking sector.
Chinese authorities may gradually retreat and leave the banks to bear their own
risks, and depositors will be able to choose banks with greater safety and better
services.
The proliferation of small and medium-sized depository institutions will
ease the difficulties for SMEs in financing. Big state-owned lenders have long
dominated China’s banking sector and their needs are not appropriately in line
with small and private enterprises, who thus suffer high financing costs.
Specifically, when monetary tightening occurs, the first companies to experience
funding difficulties are those with the most acute needs for funding, namely
SMEs. Although China has been taking various steps to promote SME financing
since around 2003, SMEs’ funding difficulties have not been improved much.

136

The fundamental problem is that Chinese economy is dependent on indirect
finance, particularly through those major state-owned banks. Banks have little
incentives to lend to SMEs because they have hitherto been able to earn
respectable net interest margins on loans to state-owned enterprises and local
governments with little nonperformance risks.
The setup of the first batch of pilot private banks signifies the entry of
private capital into the financial system, develops competitive market
environment with co-existence of diversified ownership, and helps further
formalize China’s multiple-level banking system. Operational efficiency of
banking sector will also be enhanced. Correlatively, with banks’ net interest
136
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promulgated in 2003. See Law on Promotion of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises,
available at
http://www.smefair.org.cn/en/html/NEWS/Documents/article/1245129180205.html (last
visited Aug. 10, 2015).

91

Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.

Vol. XVI

margins expected to shrink in the wake of ongoing interest rate liberalization, and
with the improvement of competitiveness of small and medium-sized banks, big
banks are also in need of seeking new business strategies to keep gaining profits.
In this sense, they may also gradually shift their focus toward lending to SMEs,
especially if more and more large corporations start to borrow directly from
capital markets and overseas.
Meanwhile, concerns are accumulated that deposit insurance may even
deteriorate the playing field. The establishment of the DIS implies the increasing
possibility of bank insolvencies, which may cause depositors unreasonably shift
deposits toward big banks. Small and medium-sized banks will have more
difficulties absorbing deposits. Furthermore, big banks are more robust and
contain lower risks than their smaller competitors. When the risk-adjusted
premium rates are implemented, small banks will face higher rates. Depositors
may view it as higher risk, which will adversely affect the deposit raising
capacity of small banks. Therefore, detailed legal procedures and preferential
policies are needed to construct a favorable development environment for small
and medium banks.
B. The Impact on the Banking Regulatory Structure
With the establishment of the CBRC in 2003, China formed its
contemporary banking regulatory structure. Before that, the PBOC had been
operating as a versatile regulatory body. The PBOC not only implemented
monetary policies and carried macroeconomic and financial responsibilities, but
also supervised individual depository institutions. As the conflicts of the PBOC’s
roles as policymaker and as supervisor became increasingly evident, China
decided to move the function of banking regulatory from the PBOC to the CBRC.
The CBRC becomes the primary regulator of the Chinese banking sector and is
responsible for both supervision and resolution of banks and other depository
institutions. The PBOC only holds its authority in maintaining financial stability
and conducting systemic risk control. In a case of bank run, the Financial
Stability Bureau of the PBOC determines the issues of the liquidity support.
Since the new banking regulatory design took place, the divergence between
the PBOC and the CBRC has become an issue hindering effective banking
supervision, due to the regulatory overlap created through the unclear allocation
of regulatory authority. The passage of the Regulations and the launch of the DIS
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is a hard-fought “turf battle” between the PBOC and the CBRC. The fight
between them for the dominating power in the design of the DIS is perhaps the
most significant reason for the delay of launching such a scheme. To ease the
tensions and accelerate reform, the State Council designated the PBOC as the
directing authority for the DIS legislative work, and ordered the CBRC and other
relevant authorities to effectively coordinate with the PBOC. Viewed from the
quasi-intentional ambiguity made by the Regulations in defining the resolution
powers of the DIFMA, however, the “turf battle” has not completely settled
down.
The resolution powers of the DIFMA are tightly related to the overall design
of the DIS, where the broader the mandates of the DIFMA are, the more
operationally independent it can be in achieving regulatory goals without external
interventions. Some jurisdictions consider the DIS as a mechanism merely to
compensate depositors, while other countries, like the United States, adopts the
DIS as a fundamental failure resolution mechanism to deal with bank insolvency.
137

Before the financial crisis, the function of the DIS varied significantly among

jurisdictions. The crisis precipitated greater convergence in practices across
countries and formed a consensus about the strong function that the DIS should
play in financial regulation and risk resolution. 138 The Regulations do not
explicitly express that the DIFMA will play the role of resolution authority, but
from the diction of many articles and from the description of its responsibilities,
it can be reasonably concluded that China’s DIS will not be a mere paybox, but
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will have broad responsibilities that the DIFMA needs to effectively participate in
risk resolution of insured institutions. 139 The DIFMA, when established, will be
granted sufficient powers to fulfill its mandates and will be able to intervene
early into the insured institutions before they lose their going-concern values.
Therefore, it’s very likely that the DIFMA will gradually become another
important pillar of the overall financial safety net and will work closely with the
CBRC in the field of risk resolution.
The CBRC is currently leading the legislative work of more long-awaited
banking infrastructural provisions--the Regulations on Commercial Bank
Insolvency and Resolution (CBRC Regulations). 140 In line with international
experience in dealing with the post-crisis era, the resolution power of the CBRC
will likely be reinforced. It is conceivably true that the CBRC will have expanded
authority and great power in providing insured institutions with a resolution
mechanism, through assets transfer, liability restructuring, etc. Thus, the range of
authorities of the DIFMA is greatly relevant to the CBRC under the context of
failure resolution.
Temporarily, the introduction of the DIS will not change the institutional
design of China’s banking regulatory structure. The DIS will first operate as a
fund, not as an independent regulatory agency. Yet, the regulatory expectations of
the DIFMA can only be achieved when it could operate as an independent agency
that is immune to the political control of other regulatory watchdogs. China’s
gradualist and unorthodox approach to the institutional reform in the financial
sector augur the future possibility that the policymakers will make the DIFMA a
Chinese FDIC. A fundamental reshuffle of China’s banking regulatory structure
will therefore likely to take place as the implementation of the DIS gets deeper.
C. The Impact on Depositors
Like all DISs, the leading objective of China’s DIS is to protect depositor’s
interests, which are reflected in following three aspects.
First, the publication of the Regulations is a clear announcement to the public
that their deposits will be under explicit guarantee. A deposit insurance fund will
139
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be established as a credible source of funding to depositors. The sense of public
assurance is important, because public concerns over the safety of deposits –
whether based on facts or only rumors – can lead, and has led, to dangerous bank
runs that can cause banks to fail. Consequently, concerns over one bank have, at
times, led to concerns over others, resulting in the so-called contagion runs. Thus,
public confidence promotes the stability of an individual bank.
Second, the DIS will strengthen market discipline over insured institutions
and encourage them to promote sound and prudential management. Market
discipline can happen in many forms, including private monitoring by interested
stakeholders, corporate governance, and ousters of bank managers through the
market for corporate control.141 When the DIS is formally established, different
institutions will have differentiated premium rates. As institutions with higher
risks will be charged higher premiums, the DIS can actually improve the banks’
internal control. Meanwhile, the DIFMA has broad regulatory and resolution
authority to actively intervene in institutions’ daily operations and take corrective
measures in a timely manner, which then enhances the stability of banking
industry and reduces institutions’ possibility to fail.
Third, the incorporation of the DIS is a fundamental improvement of
China’s financial safety net. With an appropriate financial safety net in place,
depositor confidence tends to be greater and the onset of financial crises less
likely than otherwise. Altogether with the PBOC as the lender of the last resort,
and the CBRC as the prudential regulator, the DIFMA, when established and
independently operated, will become another peak of China’s financial regulatory
framework. Thus, a more comprehensive safety net will further assure depositor
protection.
The PBOC states that the launch of the DIS will largely protect depositors’
interests. However, rather than strengthening depositor confidence, there is a
chance that the establishment of the DIS will bring more panic to China’s
financial market. The DIS will obliterate the depositors’ presumption that their
deposits will be guaranteed by the government. Therefore, a bigger challenge
may appear at an early phase of the implementation of China’s DIS: to wean the
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public from its deep-rooted attachment to the implicit government-backed DIS
without sparking a panicked shift of capital from small and medium banks to
large banks.
In order to eliminate depositors’ incomprehension and misunderstanding
about the DIS, Chinese authorities shall advance the public awareness in the DIS.
“The general public need to know about the deposit insurance system, understand
it, and be able to rely on rapid payout by the Deposit Insurer in the event of a
bank’s failure.”142 In order to achieve the smooth implication of the DIS, the
PBOC should not only further refine and detail the future DIS regulations by
fully taking into account public opinions, but also use a variety of
communication tools to deepen depositors’ understanding of the DIS on an
ongoing basis.
In sum, besides the above-mentioned trade-offs, the DIS will help reduce the
perception that there is no risk in China’s banking industry, and will pave the way
toward interest rate liberalization and a diversified and balanced banking sector.
Without such insurance, depositors could suffer great losses if banks sharply raise
rates to attract savers but then have trouble making the big payouts. The DIS
frees up banks to compete for depositors’ money without risking the savings of
their customers, which potentially challenges China’s biggest banks for deposits
and introduces some more market-based principles into the banking system.
Moreover, the DIS will generate a capital flow from banks to non-bank financial
institutions, i.e. securities institutions, insurance companies and derivatives
markets, as wholesale account holders will utilize more deposits to invest in
stocks, trusts and other financial products. It is a great opportunity for banks to
improve product design, marketing strategy and risk control, in order to capture
more customer resources. From this perspective, the DIS will also strengthen
China’s financial innovation and capital market development.

CONCLUSION
The establishment of the DIS is a major step towards reinvigorating China’s
increasingly lumbering financial system and a long-awaited move aiming at
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propelling further financial reforms. The proposed DIS can be characterized as (i)
compulsory insurance; (ii) limited but comparably high insurance coverage; (iii)
risk-adjusted pricing mechanism; and (iv) favorably strong regulatory and
resolution features. Although the Regulations outline the fundamentals of China’s
deposit insurance, its incompleteness and ambiguity also leave many important
issues blank, requiring further clarifications and the promulgation of concomitant
regulations.
There are several regulatory lessons of the DIS. First, deposit insurance has
a powerful ability to reinforce public confidence and financial stability during
financial distress. The introduction of the DIS in China is not an option but a
must made necessary by the painful bailout history and the urgent status quo.
Second, deposit insurance is not an omnipotent cure that can eliminate all
banking crisis. It adds another important layer to China’s financial safety net.
Third, the design of the DIS should be equal and transparent among all market
participants, especially when it comes to the setting of premium rates and other
issues that may differentiate the treatment of different depository institutions.
Fourth, the establishment and implementation of the DIS should follow a
phased-in step, in line with the conduct of other relevant financial reforms, and
fully take into account China’s ability to push forward all these reforms
simultaneously. Fifth, Chinese banks are facing a real challenge of the need to
achieve improved governance. Banks should take pre-event countermeasures in
terms of information disclosure, regulatory reporting, compliance mechanism,
and etc. Sixth, Chinese policymakers and regulators need to enhance cooperation
among different regulatory agencies and continue to push forward reform on the
institutional design of financial system.

Last, public awareness

and

comprehension towards the DIS should be improved through various channels to
create a favorable environment for the sound development of the DIS and other
financial schemes.
Along the road towards future reform, China will encounter multiple tough
balances to strike. It’s foreseeable that in the near term, deposit insurance will
evoke strong skepticism in the market. What’s at stake is that despite those
enormous trade-offs, policymakers and regulators should give up their regulatory
inertia to bailout-troubled institutions, and implement the DIS in a true sense.
Short-term fluctuations are temporary costs to pay, and the real effectiveness of
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